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Abstract : 
 
Monetary integration in Mercosur processed in a context of strong macroeconomic volatility. 
This paper analyzes the feasibility of a monetary union within this zone. Instead of taking in 
account all the criteria of the optimal currencies areas, this study focuses on the 
macroeconomic cycles in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. First, we analyse cross-correlation 
to identify the degree of cycle synchronization. Second, a structural VAR model is built for 
each country. It allows us to determine the sources of shocks which hit these countries. 
Third, we decompose structural innovations -especially economic policies shocks- of 
domestic SVAR into unobservable common and idiosyncratic components using a state-
space model. We assess in what extent economic policies are coordinated between the 
Mercosur countries. 
 
Keywords : Business Cycles, OCA, Comovement, VAR, Unobserved components 
model, Mercosur. 
 
 
JEL Codes: C32, E32, F42. 
2 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Common market of the South (Mercosur) was created in 1991 by the Treaty of Asuncion 
signed between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. At the beginning the formal 
project was just a free trade agreement. During the 90s, the signatory countries envisaged a 
more ambitious economic and monetary process of integration. Then, an institutional 
framework promoting economic policies coordination was gradually set up. In 2000, the 
Treaty of Ouro Preto established a permanent structure dedicated to this coordination. 
Targets and procedures intended to allow the convergence of public deficit and debt ratio 
were defined. A high-level macroeconomic Group of surveillance equivalent to the Ecofin 
council in the European Union was created.  
This move in favor of  more coordination can be partially explained by the successive shocks 
which hit the Mercosur countries during the 90s. Mexican (1994), Asian (1997), Russian 
(1998), Brazilian (1999) and Argentina (2001-2002) crises strongly increased the volatility of 
the macroeconomic variables: integration and coordination were though as efficient 
responses to financial mayhem. But in fact, it did not work. In front of shocks, economies 
gave priorities to national solution, weakening the economic and institutional links 
embodied in the Asuncion Treaty. For instance, intra-zone trade decreased over the period 
2000-2004: the intra-Mercosur exports fall from 21% of total exports in 2000 to 12.6% in 20041. 
This evolution raises the question of the feasibility of a regional monetary union between the 
Mercosur countries. The purpose of this study is to bring some elements of answer.  
Contrary to the basic optimal currencies areas (OCA) literature which proposes a costs-
benefits analysis of a monetary union, our approach is exclusively based on the business 
cycles properties of the Mercosur countries. 
A large body of empirical research focusing on symmetry and coordination issues in 
Mercosur has been published. Eichengreen (1998), and Eichengreen and Taylor (2004) use 
cross country data and panel data to address the question whether the Mercosur countries 
need a single money. Their analysis is focused on the determinants of bilateral exchange 
rates volatility and on the OCA criteria. They stressed on the lack political will as one of the 
main obstacle to monetary union. However, the synchronization of cycles is analyzed in a 
rudimentary way: Eichengreen and Taylor (2004) use as indicator of asymmetric shocks the 
increment of the natural logarithm of the ratio of the GDPs of each pair of countries, 
neglecting the propagation of shocks between countries. Fanelli and González-Rozada (2003) 
                                                 
1. For imports, shares are 19.8% and 19.1% respectively. Source: WTO, data base. 
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apply a structural VAR model to identify the cycles and the coordination evidences within 
Mercosur. They deemed “symmetry” of shocks and try to shed some light on their sources. 
The authors try also to identify the common and specific component of domestic cycles, a 
question in focus in our paper.  
Using a dynamic panel setting, Ahmed (2003) analyzes the fluctuations in the main Latin 
American countries2. The author stresses mainly on two issues: it proposes to assess, on the 
one hand to what extent short term fluctuations of domestic variables are influenced by 
external shocks, on the other hand if a monetary union is relevant within Latin American 
countries and with the United States,  from an OCA perspective. 
To sum up these works, we may conclude to a weak correlation of cycles between Argentina 
and Brazil. Such a result suggests that the common disturbances are weak and / or that the 
responses to common shocks differ. As a consequence, the two main countries of Mercosur 
have no incentive to form a monetary union. Moreover, weak business synchronization with 
the United States is mentioned, suggesting difficulties of adjustments to innovation within a 
monetary union. 
Studying Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay over the period 1991-2005, the following work shed 
a new light on integration and coordination issues amongst the Mercosur.  
The remainder of this paper is organized in five Section. Section two presents and analyzes 
business cycles in Mercosur: Cross-correlations are used to bring to light evidences of 
propagation mechanisms and comovements. Section three presents the outcomes of the 
estimates of a structural VAR model for each economy; it identifies the interdependence 
between domestic macroeconomic variables, and with external ones, and the sources of 
disturbances. Section four proposes to breakdown structural innovations of domestic SVAR 
into unobservable common and idiosyncratic components using a state-space model. These 
results are used to check evidences of economic synchronicity, and convergence of 
macroeconomic policy.  Section five concludes. 
Our results confirm partially the recent literature. Cycles synchronicity within the Mercosur 
countries is weak. We show that these economies are hit mainly by nominal shocks rather 
than real shocks. Beyond, the fact that the shocks seem similar in their nature while the 
common components are weak suggests that there is a low degree of coordination of 
economic policies between these countries. 
 
                                                 
2. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Mexico, and Venezuela.  
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CYCLICAL COMOVEMENTS IN MERCOSUR: SOME EVIDENCES ON EMPIRICAL 
REGULARITIES. 
 
 To investigate the issues of business cycle synchronization and propagation mechanisms of 
shocks we will begin the study identifying some stylized facts relative to the three main 
partners of the Mercosur, and the United States.  
Reporting in Table 2.1 the average quarterly industrial production index (IPI) growth rate of 
the three countries from 1991Q1 to 2005Q3, we can give a first conclusion about the dynamic 
of Mercosur countries for the period. 
Table 2.1 Quarterly IPI Growth and Volatility (average quarterly growth rate in percentage 
for 1991:1 to 2005:3) 
 Argentina Brazil  Uruguay  
 Mean 0.003837 0.005532 0.000687 
 Median 0.008998 0.008397 -0.004677 
 Maximum 0.069170 0.078137 0.161532 
 Minimum -0.146305 -0.109355 -0.147168 
 Std. Dev. 0.037041 0.032248 0.062580 
Source: author’s calculations using IMF data base. 
As a whole, average growth rates are very low. Brazil exhibits the highest with the lower 
volatility; at the opposite, the Uruguayan IPI growth rate is both low and volatile. The wide 
gap between the observed maximum and minimum values of the growth rate reveals a high  
degree of instability. To conclude, real volatility is fairly high for the three countries (but it is 
the case of emerging countries in general, and of the Latin American one in particular!). 
 
Choice of the Frequency and the Industrial Production Index 
 
We use quarterly data from 1990Q1 to 2005Q3 for two reasons: 
- on the one hand, annual data are generally available for long periods, even for 
emerging countries; but in this case their quality is low. Besides, during the 80s the 
three economies were very instable,  mainly due to the debt crisis and the sequences 
of hyperinflation:  such disturbances make the data processing very complex and 
instable.  
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- on the other hand, quarterly data are more appropriated to identify the business cycle 
dynamic and the links between short et medium terms. Unfortunately, quarterly data 
are available and comparable since only 1990 for the three countries. 
We conclude choosing quarterly frequency for the period 1990-2005. 
As index of production, we opted for IPI (and not GDP) for it is a monthly index while GDP 
is an annual one: although IPI is more volatile, we keep more information quarterizing a 
monthly IPI than picking a quarterized (yearly) GDP. Beyond, as IPI includes mainly output 
of tradable goods, it excludes an agricultural sector too sensible to seasonality and climatic 
shock, and a service sector characterized by the importance informal activities (Agenor, 
McDermott and Prasad, 2000). 
 
Stationarity and Cointegration Investigation 
 
We begin checking - for each country - the stationarity of interest rates, and of the logarithm 
of all the other variables3. Standard Augmented Dickey Fuller tests  are largely perturbed by 
numerous shocks, periods of high inflations, stabilization programs, and change in 
monetary, currency, or fiscal regimes. But even after correction of structural breaks (Perron, 
P.,1989), all data are I(1), except interest rates I(0). Finally, tests of cointegration (Johansen) 
failed to find any cointegrating vector4.  
To stationarize this series I(1), we use two detrending method: 
1) first differentiation of the logarithm of variables; 
2) decomposition trend/cycles by an HP filter. Investigating business cycles in 
developing countries, Agenor, McDermott, and Prasad (2000) assess cycles length 
between two and four years. In another study, Rand and Tarp (2002) confirm that the 
usual length for industrialized countries -between 24 and 32 quarters– is not relevant 
for emerging market: the duration of business cycle is clearly shorter, between 7.7 to 
12 quarters.  So, we deduce a parameter “lambda” of 1600 for the United States and 
400 for our emerging economies.  
                                                 
3. Our model contains eight variables: world oil price, US industrial production index, Fed Funds 
interest rate, and for each Mercosur country: industrial production index, price production index, 
money market interest rate, monetary aggregate M2, and the real exchange rate. All the data are 
quarterly and stemming from International Financial Statistics of the IMF. For a detailed analysis of 
these variables, see our SVAR model below. 
4. All the tests are available upon request to the authors. 
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In the following section, we just present the conclusions inferred from times series detrended 
by HP filter5.  
 
 Cycles and Synchronization on the Mercosur Area 
 
We measure the degree of business comovements of quarterly IPI growth  by pairs of 
countries. We will mainly focus on the magnitude of cycles synchronization in the OCA 
perspective, looking at the cross-correlation of conjuncture between the three LA countries, 
and between them and the United States. For each L.A. country, we computed also the cross-
correlation between a set of key macroeconomic variables. We consider here only results 
about IPI cross-correlations6. 
Following Agenor, McDermott and Prasad (2000), we measure the degree of comovement of 
the stationary component yt with another xt, derived from our series using the same filter 
H.P., by the magnitude of the correlation coefficient ( ) { }, 0, 1, 2,...j jΔ ∈ ± ± . We will 
consider the series “yt” to be procyclic, acyclic, or contercyclic if the contemporaneous 
correlation ( )0 ,Δ is positive, zero, or negative, respectively. In addition, we deem the series 
yt to be strongly correlated if ( )0,27 0,27j≤ Δ ≤ , weakly correlated if ( )0,13 0,13j≤ Δ ≤ , 
and uncorrelated in the other cases7. We say that yt leads the cycle by “j” periods if ( )jΔ  
is a maximum for a positive “j”, is synchronous with the cycle if j=0, and lags the cycle if 
( )jΔ is a maximum for negative j. 
We distinguish the cycles with the United States on the one side, and the cycles between the 
Mercosur countries on the other side. 
 
Cross-correlations Between the United States and the Mercosur Countries 
 
Figure 2.1 exhibits business cycles estimated with HP filter for the United States and our 
three emerging countries. 
                                                 
5 A similar analysis realized with log differenced data, but not presented here, converges to the same 
conclusion.  
 
6. Results concerning prices production index and real exchange rates are available with the authors. 
7. The approximate standard error of these correlation coefficients, computed under the null 
hypothesis at the true correlation coefficient is zero and given a number of observations per country in 
it sample, is about 13,5. 
 7
Figure 2.1 Cycles in the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay 
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NB: the prefix "h" and the suffix "c" indicate that the matter is about cycles stemming from 
the filtered (by HP) IPI. Letters A, B, U, US, indicate the three countries of Mercosur and the 
United States respectively. 
Source: author’s calculations using IMF data base. 
The figure confirms a different periodicity, (not fundamentally modified by the choice of the 
lambda). Peaks and troughs of cycles of the Mercosur countries correspond to peaks and 
troughs of the American cycles, but the difference of periodicity involves a higher number of 
fluctuations in the first group of countries. Indeed, these are subjected to numerous shocks 
which increase their macroeconomic volatility. Thus the lagged correlations lose a part of 
their meaning as driven forces. The contemporaneous cross-correlations, presented in 
appendix 1, show very significant links between the United States on one side, and 
Argentina and Uruguay of the other one (0.39 in both cases) and lesser influence of the 
American cycles towards Brazil ( 0.27 ). We thus have here a first illustration of the greater 
autonomy of this economy, as will be confirmed below. 
However, the figure 1 seems to reveal two regimes: one before 1999, period for which the 
cycles are little synchronized, one after 1999 for which situations are more synchronized with 
the United States. The following explanation can fit with these facts: the first period is 
marked by a new phase of massive capital inflows which increased the autonomy of the 
conjuncture of these countries with respect to that of industrial countries. The decrease of 
capital inflows during the second period made more dependent the conjuncture of these 
countries of that of the USA. 
In terms of the relevance a dollar area with the United States, we can thus conclude that the 
conditions are not gathered. The three Mercosur countries and the United States do not form 
an optimal currencies area. 
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Cross-correlations Between the Mercosur Countries 
 
As reported in the appendix 1, the cross-correlations are sharply less significant than those 
obtained usely for the countries of the European Union and for the various states of the 
United States. However, the correlation between the cycles of our three countries is not nil. 
Indeed, the contemporaneous correlations are significant except within Brazil and Uruguay. 
The lagged correlations confirm a common cycle with a three years periodicity for Argentina 
and Brazil: so, the figure in appendix 1 exhibits a fairly significant negative cross-correlation 
for six quarters, and again a strong positive correlation for twelve / thirteen quarters. At 
least, the Argentina cycle precedes the Uruguayan one. 
 
MODELING DOMESTIC CYCLES AND PROPAGATION MECHANISMS 
 
Traditional literature about regional integration and OCA stresses on the 
identification of common innovations and on the magnitude of convergence in the 
adjustment process and in the policy packages. This section aims at deepening the previous 
study on comovement, shedding a special light on propagation mechanisms. As explained 
above, in the context of strong links of macroeconomic variables with complexes feed back 
linkages, VAR approach constitutes a useful tool: it allows to assess the consequences of 
structural (orthogonal) shocks on endogenous external and policy variables. The choice of a 
simple VAR in difference is deduced to the lack of cointegration vectors (any other solution 
would lead to greater forecast errors, as showed Allen, P.G., and Fildes, R., 2004). 
  VARs are “a-theoretical”: the usual way to introduce theory passes by the inclusion of 
restrictions in the structural VARs (SVARs), leading to specific predictions relative to the 
time path of endogenous variables as consequences of  shocks.  
 
Variables selections 
 
Our choice of variables is the traditional one for VARs analyzing external shocks, and 
macroeconomic packages in open economies (Favero, C., 2001, Lütkepohl, H., & Krätzig, M., 
2004). For the external variables, we chose the international oil price (notes WOP), the US 
Industrial Product Index (US_IPI) and the US Federal Fund Rate (US_R), a way to account 
for the main real supply and financial shocks. For the domestic variables (for each country 
“i”, I= A, B, U) , we took Industrial Product Index (i_IPI), Producer Prices Index (i_PPI), 
money market interest rate (i_R), money aggregate (i_M2), and real exchange rate (i_R). The 
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domestic  interest rate is the money market one: it is not exactly equivalent of the Federal 
Fund Rate… but it is the only available for this sample. 
One of the first characteristic of this model is to build an identical VAR for each of our three 
economies, building-in the same elementary three variables US model (including: world oil 
price, US IPI, and US Federal Fund Rate). We chose this option instead of adding external 
variables as purely exogenous to underline interaction between these three variables in each 
of our national models. Thus, each national VAR is an 8 variables model, with 3 external 
variables and 5 domestic variables, close to the seven variables model of Kim, S. and 
Roubini, N., 1997,  for the generic non-US country (it just lacks US product index). 
As usual in literature, we suppose that structural (orthogonal) shocks are linear 
combinations of the residuals in reduce form VAR models. The identification of structural 
shocks of interest is carried out using contemporaneous restrictions based on the Choleski 
ordering of a recursive economic structure (with the most exogenous variable ordered first, 
i.e. here the external variables: international oil price, us product index, and Federal Fund). It 
means that contrary to numerous similar works, we don’t apply the “BQ” decomposition 
identification procedure (Blanchard, O., and Quah, D.,  1989). Assuming a long term 
neutrality of nominal shock would seem widely arbitrary for a work covering about twelve 
or so years, even if business cycles are – as showed above - shorter for these countries than 
for the industrialized one.  In fine, the ordering follows the following order: world oil price, 
US IPI, US FFR, Domestic IPI, Domestic PPI, Domestic Interest Rate, Domestic Money 
Aggregate, and Real Exchange Rate, with a just identified scheme: contrary to Kim, S.,  and 
Roubini, N., 1997, we consider here domestic interest rate as more exogenous than money 
demand (in their paper, both authors proposed an over-identified model, with a 
simultaneous feed back between money demand and central bank rule).  
Then, we deduce (orthogonal) structural innovations from residuals of the  reduced form 
VAR, using identification restriction scheme (presented above). They are used to perform  
impulse response experiment and variance decomposition analysis of forecast errors. At 
least, a state-space model will carry out a decomposition of structural shocks to extract the 
eventual common component. 
 
The model 
 
The first step was estimating our VAR (in first difference of logarithm) for the three 
countries. The number of lags was selected using the common set of criteria and tests 
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(available on the software Eviews).  In presence of contradictory results, we followed the 
parsimony principle and chose the shorter lag (one lag for every country case). For each 
country “K”, the standard (reduced) form of our VAR with constant is the following :  
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In order to account for specific country shocks during the period, we added dummies: 
- for Brazil, from 1990Q1 to 1994Q2, i.e. for the period of accelerated inflation, up to the 
Stabilization Real Plan,  
- for Uruguay, from 2001Q3 to 2003Q1, a period perturbed by Argentinean and 
Brazilian instability.  
Curiously, tests for a dummy variable for the Argentinean currency board crisis didn’t reveal 
a significant effect. So, we did not keep it in our model. 
 
We have to keep in mind that our three economies have adopted different exchange rate 
regime. Beyond, they have evolved, following independent paths for the period: 
- from 1991 to 2001, Argentina has adopted a currency board (hard peg), then an 
independent regime of floating; 
- from 1991 to 1997, Brazil has adopted a crawling band regime (a kind of real 
exchange rate targeting) more or less “de jure” and more or less narrow, according to 
the context. After the strong currency crisis, in January 1999, Brazil implemented 
flexible exchange rate regime combined with inflation targeting.  
- From 1991 to 2001, Uruguay adopted a crawling band, substituted in june 2002 by a 
flotation regime. 
 
Results 
 
Our purpose is twofold. On the one hand, we identify what kinds of shocks, real or nominal, 
produce higher fluctuations in the three countries. On the other hand, we deem the similarity 
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of the reactions of macroeconomic variables to these shocks in our sample. We aim at 
obtaining a first outline of the behavior of these economies shocked by the structural 
innovations (notably in terms of speed of adjustment); moreover, we are waiting for 
information concerning economic policies responses to shocks. 
We account for various kinds of shocks: 
- two external real shocks: the world oil price as an international shock, and the U.S. 
industrial production index as a regional shock; 
- one domestic real shock with the industrial production index compiled for each Mercosur 
country; 
- four domestic nominal shocks including production price index, money market interest 
rates, monetary aggregate M2 and the real exchange rate. As the real and nominal exchange 
rates produce similar effects on countries, we classify the first ones in the nominal shocks8. 
In addition, over the studied period, the real exchange rate is strongly determined by the 
evolution of production prices. Nominal interest rates and real exchange rates are our policy 
variables. As in Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), M2 represents here the money demand (we 
don’t consider it as a policy instrument).  In spite of this assumption, responses of M2 to 
shocks remain difficult to interpret for the following reasons: 
- in some case (for instance, Brazil), this aggregate includes liquid public debts. As a 
result, the behavior of M2 does not necessarily follow a transactional logic; 
- evolution of M2 are partly linked to the dollarization of countries. More exactly, it is 
advisable to take into account the facts that the degree of dollarization is not the same among 
studied countries, and that M2 eventually includes deposits in foreign currencies. Let us 
clarify this point. 
Using the classification proposed by Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003), Argentina and 
Brazil belong to Type I dollarization –in which domestic and external liability dollarization 
co-exist- while Uruguay is a dollarized economy of Type II where dollarization is 
predominantly of a domestic nature. The degree of dollarization is different between these 
countries: high in Argentina (index 20 on a scale that goes from 0 to 30) and Uruguay (21), 
but moderate in Brazil (7). By exhibiting the share of foreign deposits in percent of total 
deposits, Table 3.1 confirms these facts.  
 
 
 
                                                 
8. This observation is valid also for industrial countries. See Favero (2000). 
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Table 3.1 Foreign Currency Denominated Deposits (in percent of total deposits) 
 1990 2001 2004 
Argentina 47.2 71.5 10.7* 
Brazil 0.0 6.1 6.5 
Uruguay 88.6 83.0 83.0 
* the decrease results from the forced “pesification” of the economy after the exchange rate crisis in 
January 2002. 
Source : Rennhack and Nozaki (2006). 
 
Finally, we end observing that in Argentina, M2 includes some deposits in dollars, in 
opposition with Brazil and Uruguay. In the Brazilian case it is not really important given its 
moderate degree of dollarization of the economy. But in Uruguay; we observe that the 
demand for money measured by M2 does not respond exclusively to the traditional factors 
as predicted by  monetary theory: it also depends on (external and domestic) events 
influencing the confidence in the domestic currency. For instance, during the Argentina 
crisis, the M3 growth (which includes dollars deposits) balanced the M2 decrease in 
Uruguay,  as a consequence of a greater dollarization of the economy. Indeed Argentinean 
crisis raises doubt on the sustainability of the exchange rate regime in Uruguay9. 
 
External Real Shocks: Responses of Domestic IPI 
 
The world oil price shock brings about two major influences on domestic economies. First, as 
a negative supply shock, it ought to carry a negative effect on the activity. But in the case of 
the studied countries, this expected effect will be balanced by the fact that Brazil and 
Argentina produce oil and other raw materials: as such they benefit from increasing oil and 
raw material prices (in many cases, the prices of these last ones used to follow oil prices 
fluctuations). Second, oil price increase is also an inflationary shock, leading to higher 
domestic production prices. In the following lines, we just consider the first effect. 
The observation of IPI responses to WOP and US_IPI shocks shows a prevailing short term 
impact (about one-two quarters), with fluctuations of small magnitude. For instance, as 
result of a WOP innovation, we observe an increase of the growth rate of IPI for producers of 
gas and oil (Argentina and Brazil), and a limited drop in Uruguay. However, in every case, 
the equilibrium is restored within one year. 
                                                 
9. The exchange rate regime of Uruguay collapsed in June 2002. The country adopted a floating 
regime. 
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Variance decomposition confirms these results. Innovations on WOP or the US_IPI never 
explain more than 10% of the variance of  the IPI for our sample of three countries. 
 
External Real Shocks: Responses of Domestic Nominal Variables 
 
In three countries, a WOP shock leads to a price increase, either on the impact, or at the end 
of the first quarter. The adjustment of production prices is quite fast in the three countries. 
The shock is absorbed after five – six quarters. The prices fluctuations are particularly 
marked and significant in Argentina. These facts can find two different interpretations.  
On one side, it is an indication of higher flexibility in Argentina, with regard to the other 
countries. The fact that the adjustment in Argentina is a little faster consolidates this 
interpretation. On the other side, the strong fluctuations in prices can be the consequence of 
the currency board. This monetary regime reduces the smooth adjustments of the economy 
to shocks. As a consequence, either the adjustments are fast, but costly in term of short-run 
instability, or on the contrary they are very slow and painful. 
The short-term prices increase following a shock on US_IPI is in accordance with the 
expected effects. The similarity of the effects with the shock on WOP does not mean that 
transmission mechanisms are identical. Higher oil prices increase the production costs, while 
the supply increase due to the shock on US_IPI entails a price increase of raw materials, and 
possibly wage costs, with an impact on the PPI. 
We find again differences from the point of view of the size of the fluctuations. The 
Argentinean prices react very strongly while the Uruguayan prices little. Also, the 
adaptation is longer in the first country with regard to the second. The two main economies 
of our sample have a significant price decrease after three quarters in Argentina and six in 
Brazil. 
Variance decompositions confirm partially the previous results. The innovations on US_IPI 
explain a significant share of the prices variance in Argentina and Uruguay, but not in Brazil. 
About the interest rates reaction to external shocks, two policy cases must be distinguished. 
For countries having adopted an intermediate exchange rate regime on the greater part of 
period, i.e. Brazil and Uruguay, the world oil price shock is followed by a decline of the 
interest rate on three – four quarters. We can interpret this reaction as a traditional counter-
cyclical answer to a negative shock. In both economies again, the interest rates increase  few 
time after the US_IPI shock, and then decrease. This path rests on the pro-cyclical behavior of 
international capital flows: risk premium decreases while the American conjuncture 
 14
improves, under the influence of better financial conditions in international financial 
markets. For Argentina - only country of our sample with hard peg - the reactions of the 
interest rate path seem much more struck. Indeed, the currency board reduces in a very 
strong way the ability of the economy to respond smoothly to shocks. 
However, the interest rates reactions to previous shocks are little significant. The 
interpretation can be the following one: whatever the exchange rate regime, the rooms for 
maneuver of monetary policies were weak on the main part of the period. Indeed in the three 
countries, the interest rate was used to enforce the nominal anchor (where the exchange rate 
appears every time) in a context of disinflation policies. The counter-cyclical responses to 
shocks are thus limited. This analysis seems to be confirmed by the variance decompositions: 
none of the external real variables exerts any influence on the interest rates, except Uruguay 
with the US_IPI. The innovations on this variable explain between 11 and 12% of the 
variance of U_PPI after eight quarters.  
For the three countries, the responses of M2 to real external shocks are either not significant, 
or of very short term, with the exception of Uruguay. The responses of M2 in Brazil seem to 
follow those of the interest rate to the various shocks. More precisely, the fall in money 
demand on the impact of WOP shock is the consequence of the interest rate decrease. The 
higher money demand following the shock on US_IPI is explained by the interest rate 
increase consecutive to this external shock. Let us remind that in Brazil, the aggregate M2 
includes liquid public debt. In Argentina, the adaptation of M2 to external shocks follows a 
transactional logic. It is linked to the adjustment of the prices. 
We find the weak influence of the external variables in the analysis of the variance 
decompositions. The innovations on the American production explain between 10 and 16% 
of the variance of the Uruguayan monetary aggregate. Neither the innovations on WOP, nor 
those on the US_IPI, explain the variance of M2 in the two other countries. 
In the three countries, the real exchange rates have a similar reaction to a WOP shock: strong 
contemporaneous depreciation and then appreciation. The responses are just significant in 
Argentina and Uruguay for one quarter; the effect is shorter for Brazil. Variance 
decompositions confirm this outcome:  WOP innovations explain 14% of the real exchange 
rate variance in Argentina after two quarters, and 9.4% of the contemporaneous variance in 
Uruguay. No results are significant for Brazil.  
The responses of the real exchange rates to shocks on the American industrial production 
lead us to a similar analysis. Indeed, the disinflation period implies that prices in the United 
States as in the Latin American countries remained relatively stable during the 90s. As a 
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result, the real exchange rates react weakly to US_IPI shocks. One more time, variance 
decompositions confirm theses observations. 
 
External Nominal Shock: Response of Domestic Real and Nominal Variables 
 
The US interest rates shocks are interpreted as monetary policy ones. After one quarter, the 
output falls slightly following the monetary contraction in the United States. The prices do 
not show significant responses. The interest rates increase in Brazil and in Uruguay (what 
seems in accordance with the traditional financial links), but decrease in Argentina. 
However, this effect is a very short one (less than one quarter) and according to common 
knowledge about the currency board running, interest rate adjusts very quickly in Argentina. 
The responses of the aggregate M2 are weakly or not significant with the exception of the 
Uruguay: we observe a decline of M2 on the impact of the shock explained by a monetary 
substitution process in favour of the dollars deposits not included in M2. In the three 
countries however, the adjustment is fast. And the real exchange rates exhibit an over-
shooting process, appreciating on the impact of the shock, to  depreciate in a second time (as 
expected). The fluctuations exhibits short run duration. 
Overall, responses of domestic variables are weakly significant and produce only short term 
effects. This does not imply that Latin American countries are not influenced by US interest 
rates. However, over the sample period, except 1994-1995 and the period after the second 
quarter of 2004, the main trend has been an US expansive monetary policy. As a result, the 
size of interest rates shocks looks relatively weak over the period.  
Variance decompositions confirm the weak influence of US interest rate. The innovations of 
this variable explain the variance of the Argentinean interest rate (as expected for a currency 
board country) but without persistence effect (15% of the contemporaneous variance; 9.5% at 
quarter two), the variance of Uruguayan aggregate M2 (9.6% of the contemporaneous 
variance without persistence), and the variance of the Uruguayan real exchange rate with a 
strong persistence effect (17.1% of the contemporaneous variance; around 15% after). 
 
Domestic Real Shocks 
 
Shock on domestic IPI generates a very fast adjustment for Brazil and Uruguay (less than one 
year), and a slower one for Argentina (two years). This sluggish adjustment is logical in a 
currency board. Prices and interest reactions are not significant in Uruguay. Prices responses 
in the two other countries are explained by supply effects: weak pressures on market imply 
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lower prices. This expected response is instantaneous in Brazil and lagged in Argentina (one 
quarter). Monetary aggregates in Argentina and Uruguay exhibit a path conform to the cash 
transaction approach: M2 increases after the IPI shocks. On the contrary, the weight of short 
term public debt titles in M2 turns difficult the interpretations in term of instability of money 
demand in Brazil in reaction to IPI shock. In fact M2 seems to follow the evolution of interest 
rate which decreases on the impact of the shock. At last, real exchange rates react weakly, 
and for a very small period. 
In short, for the three economies of Mercosur, the responses to the domestic supply shocks 
are thus of short duration and are weak or not significant, except for Brazil,. Moreover, the 
variance decompositions of the various domestic variables show that the innovations on the 
IPI explain the other variables only for Brazil (but without long term effect). For instance, the 
innovations on B_IPI (Industrial Production Index of Brazil) explain 15% of the 
contemporaneous prices variance… but just 9% after two quarters. Other nominal variables 
weakly influenced by B_IPI are interest rate (11.3% and 8.3%) and M2 (9.7% and 8.7%) for the 
contemporaneous and quarter two variances respectively. 
 
Domestic Nominal Shocks 
 
We consider shock on PPI (Production Prices Index) as a demand one. Argentina shows a 
rapid adjustment with strong fluctuations of production index. In the other countries, the 
adjustment is smooth, and without major fluctuations. The responses of production are weak 
or not significant in the three countries. Interest rates increase in reaction of inflationary 
pressures. They follow the prices adjustments. In countries with “intermediate” exchange 
rate regimes, interest rates responses are strong at short term, and the adjustment is slow. 
This path is explained by a weaker credibility of monetary policy. Monetary authorities are 
constrained to react quickly in order to prevent the development of indexation mechanisms. 
Real-balances effect explains the increase of M2 after shock on domestic prices. On real 
exchange rates, we have a significant appreciation over some relevant time horizon (four 
quarters in Argentina, six in Brazil, and eight in Uruguay), but the effects are really 
significant only in three countries, for approximately two quarters. 
The analysis of variance decompositions allows us to stress the influence of prices in these 
economies. Innovations on prices do not explain the variance of production, but they exert a 
significant influence on other nominal variables. In the three countries, the effect on interest 
rates is important and persistent (over 30% in Argentina after two quarters; between 27 and 
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38% pour Brazil; from 33 to 49% in Uruguay). The reaction of authorities to any pressure on 
prices rests on the inflationary history in these countries. We find also a significant influence 
on the monetary aggregates M2 (particularly for Brazil). The impact is less important in  both  
dollarized countries (Uruguay and especially Argentina). Innovations on prices explain 
around 25% of the variance of the real exchange rate in Brazil and Uruguay, suggesting a 
limited adjustment of the nominal exchange rate linked to the fear of floating. The extreme 
rigidity of nominal exchange rate under a currency board explains the fact that prices exert a 
strong influence on the real exchange rate in Argentina (more than 55% of its variance). 
The innovations on interest rates are monetary policy shocks. In the three countries, IPI 
decreases after the shock, but the effect is particularly significant in Argentina. The 
production in countries with intermediate exchange rate regimes reacts less to the interest 
rate shock. Prices responses exhibit a traditional puzzle: prices increase on the impact of the 
shock, then decrease. Prices movements can also be interpreted as a Cavallo-Patman effect 
where higher interest rates increase production costs via the financing needs of working 
capital, leading to inflationary pressures (Taylor, 1981). A liquidity puzzle is observed for the 
responses of M2 in Brazil and Uruguay: money demand increases after the interest rate 
shock. As stressed above, money demands are unstable in these countries. In Argentina, the 
responses of M2 are consistent with the expected effects in traditional money demand 
functions: the opportunity cost to hold money increases with the interest rate. As a result, 
money demand falls. The responses of the real exchange rates in Argentina and Uruguay are 
consistent with prices. In Brazil, we observe an immediate depreciation followed by an 
appreciation. 
In some ways, the adjustments after an interest rates shock seem fairly fast in the three 
countries: the main part of adjustment for the set of endogenous variable lasts four quarters 
for Argentina, seven for Brazil and six for Uruguay. Interestingly, variance decompositions 
suggest that innovations on interest rates are not relevant explicative variable. They explain a 
part of the variance of prices in Brazil, but only at long run (sixteen quarters), and their 
influence is moderate (10%). Interest rates innovations explain around 10% of the 
contemporaneous variance of M2 in Argentina (but the effect diminishes quickly), and 14% 
of the variance of M2 in Brazil (with a persistence effect). The weak influence of the interest 
rates results partially from the historical constraints weighting on monetary policy: a long 
run fight against inflation has reduced the monetary activism in the three studied countries. 
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A shock on M2 is interpreted as a nominal demand shock. The monotonous Argentinean 
money path converges smoothly in about six quarters. For Brazil and Uruguay, the path 
exhibits a negative overshooting, and then converges in about three quarters. These schemes 
can be explained by the difference of nominal anchor, linked to the exchange rate regime: in 
Argentina, the hard peg stabilizes a money demand (which stays instable in both the other 
partners of Mercosur). Innovations on M2 induce a very short duration in macroeconomic 
fluctuations: two quarters in Uruguay, less that six in Brazil and six quarters in Argentina. 
The impact in Argentina is stronger. Variance decompositions show that innovations on M2 
explain from 16% to 18.5% of the variance of IPI in Argentina, but they do not exert any 
influence in the two other countries. Innovations on the monetary aggregate explain 10% of 
the variance of Argentinean prices after one year. The variance of interest rates in Argentina 
and Brazil is explained at the level of 12% and 10% respectively after four quarters. The long 
term influence of the interest rate rests on the monetarist approach of the monetary policy in 
the three countries. Indeed, a risk of excessive liquidity is synonymous of monetary tensions. 
Last, innovations on M2 explain between 12 and 10% of the real exchange rate variance in 
Uruguay. 
Shock on real exchange rate is a depreciation followed by a slight and short re-appreciation, 
in the three countries. The effects on other variables have as short duration, between two and 
three quarters. The responses of Uruguayan variables are particularly weak. These responses 
could be explained by the fact that the standard-deviation of the real exchange rate in 
Uruguay is the weakest of the three countries. On the contrary, the standard-deviation is the 
highest in Argentina: but it is probably due to the exchange rate crisis of January 2002. 
Variance decompositions confirm this weak influence of the real exchange rate over the 
sample period... But we must remember that during the main part of the period, monetary 
authorities had smoothed its volatility, either because its adoption as “official” nominal 
anchor, or to avoid “pass through” effects (even after the adoption of inflation targeting and 
flotation regime).     
 
Preliminary conclusions 
 
The previous results show that the studied countries react to nominal shocks rather than to 
real shocks. On the one hand, innovations on nominal variables produce the most significant 
fluctuations. On the other hand, they exhibit the strongest persistence effect.  
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In the three countries – and more particularly in Argentina, the only country of our sample 
with a hard peg regime during the main part of the period - we observe a weak monetary 
activism. However, our results show that even if countries were hit by rather similar shocks, 
their adjustments and their reactions were different. In other words, VARs suggest some 
similarities in the nature of the shocks, but they show clearly that the domestic dynamics 
were different after the shocks. From this point of view, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay do 
not constitute an optimal currencies area. Our last study will confirm this outcome. 
 
IDENTIFICATION OF COMMON AND COUNTRY SPECIFIC COMPONENTS OF 
STRUCTURAL SHOCKS  USING STATE SPACE MODEL 
 
The main purpose of the VAR estimation is to obtain non-recursive orthogonalization 
of the error terms for impulse response analysis and variance decompositions of forecast 
errors. Whatever the identification restrictions (short or long run), and their theoretical (or 
“a-theoretical”) foundations (choice of an “ad-hoc” scheme of identification, or  
decomposition “ à la Blanchard and Quah” contrasting  demand and supply shocks on the 
basis of long run neutrality on supply side), these experiments don’t allow the distinction 
between common and specific components of fluctuations and shocks. However, this 
distinction, and overall the weight of common component, are the fundamental criteria of 
judgment in the choice of economic and monetary integration. Following the OCA theory, a 
too light weight of common component implies significant adjustment of exchange rates in 
case of strong shocks. Such adjustments are difficult to endure in a simple free trade area. 
Moreover, it becomes impossible in case of common monetary zone. In short, any integration 
process implies symmetry, i.e. a large common component. 
 
The model 
 
 In order to assess the share of the common and idiosyncratic components in the 
variability of the structural shocks, we propose a breakdown in two unobservable stochastic 
components using Kalman filter (Harvey, A.C., 1989, Kim., C.J., Nelson, C.R., 1999). The 
same method has been used by Bosco N’Goma (2000) for members of CFA Zone, by 
N.Chamie, A.Desserres, and R.Lalonde, 1994 for a comparison between Europe and USA, or 
by Lalonde and St-Amand (1993) for ALENA. 
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We report here an adaptation of the explanations proposed by N.Chamie, 
A.Desserres, and R.Lalonde, 1994 for the two countries case. 
Consider a model breaking down shocks - affecting two regions A and B designing 
respectively Argentina and Brazil - into two unobservable components: a common and an 
idiosyncratic components. A state-space model is composed of two blocks.  
The first block calls “measurement equation” (or system) of the state space model 
links the (known), dependant variables of the model, here  ,A Bt tε ε ,  to the (unknown) 
unobservable variables, : ,  ,  C At tn n n
B
t
0
0
c
tA
C A At
tB
C B Bt
t
n
n
n
α αε
β βε
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥=⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
 
Let us keep in mind that ,A Bt tε ε are the structural innovations estimated by our VARs (in 
fact, they are also unobservable10!). We decompose these structural innovations in a common 
component, the country A specific component, and the country B specific component. 
 The second block called transition equation generates these 
components , departing from some assumptions regarding the stochastic 
proprieties of 
,  ,  C At tn n n
B
t
,A Bt tε ε  and . Using the Software Rats, structural 
innovations 
,  ,  C At tn n n
B
t
,A Bt tε ε  were normalized with unit variances. This normalization allows us 
to compare more easily structural shocks relative to a specific variable across our three 
systems (one by country). 
In order to respect an adding up constraint (for each country, the weighted sum of the 
variance of idiosyncratic component and common component must be equal to 
the unity), we will restrict them imposing the variance to be equal to unity. So,the transition 
system will be: 
, ,C A Bt t tn n n
 
                                                 
10 Curiously, authors using this approach, like N.Chamie, A.Desserres, and R.Lalonde, 1994, or Bosco N’Goma, 
J.M.,2000 qualified the structural shocks as observable variables, forgetting that they are the outcome of the 
assumptions concerning the specification of the VAR and of the identification matrix!  
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The solutions of the system will be the weights: αi , i=A, B, C . Regarding to the 
assumption of unity variance of structural shock, and components, the estimated parameters 
of the idiosyncratic components αA = 1-αC, and βB= 1-βB C represent the proportion of 
variance of country-shocks that are explained by the country specific-component, and αC, 
and βC the relative weight of common component. For purposes of identification, the 
common and specific components are assumed to be uncorrelated in the estimation process. 
 We can give an example of the program with the decomposition of each domestic IPI 
shock in common and country specific components: (A, B, U, indicate the countries, CC the 
common component, SAC, SBC, and SUC the country specific components, C1, C2, C3 the 
parameters indicatint the weight of common component ): 
( )
( )
( )
_ _ 1* 1_ 1 *
_ _ 2* 1_ 2 *
_ _ 3* 1_ 1 *
[var 1]
[var 1]
[var 1]
[var 1]
A choc ipi c CC c SAC
B choc ipi c CC c SBC
U choc ipi c CC c SAC
SAC
SBC
SUC
CC
= +
= +
= +
= =
= =
= =
= =
 
We have printed in Appendix 4 the outcomes of our results (performed with Eviews). 
Specification tests are derived using a maximum likelihood approach (Harvey, A.C., 1989).     
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Foreign shocks 
 
In all our results, C(1), C(2), and C(3) point out the weight of common component in the 
structural shocks for Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay respectively. 
Shocks on foreign variables give us an assessment of the method pertinence. These variables, 
are presents in the three VAR models (and thus endogenous).I the Choleski matrix allowing 
the identification of structural shocks, they are ordered as following (from the less to the 
more endogenous): Oil Price (WOP), US Industrial Production Index (US_IPI), US interest on 
the Fed. Funds (US_R). We can assume that the series of structural innovations for this 
foreign variables - deduced from the three equations of the three country models - embody a 
significant common component for the three countries: the origin of these shocks is 
exogenous and common for the domestic bloc of the three country models! 
In spite of the poor performance of oil price estimates, we can check that the oil price shock 
common in the three systems… is effectively recognized as common by our program! It is a 
way to check that the UCM (Unobservable Component Model) identifies common 
components. In less degree, it is also the case for the two other external variables (US_IPI and 
US_R). In table A.4.1., A.4.2., and A.4.3., the common component represents between 70 and 
80% of the variance for oil shock, a little less for both the other shocks.    
We can note also that the score for Brazil is always lower (a confirmation of the larger 
autonomy of Brazilian economy regarding to US conjuncture?)  
 
Domestic shocks 
 
The first shock is represented by domestic series of structural innovations in the IPI in 
the three VARs. (Table A.4.4). The Argentinean cycle is taken as bases (i.e. as reference for 
the other countries). The Brazilian real cycle is not significantly linked to any common trend, 
on the contrary of the Uruguayan one. But even in this last case, the weight of the common 
component in lower that 10%. 
We try to estimate a common component by pairs of countries in Mercosur: the 
experiment is consistent with the previous outcomes: Uruguay shares probably the same 
proportion of common component than in the three country model (even if the test here is 
less significant), and the Brazilian shock doesn’t share any common component neither with 
Argentina, nor with Uruguay. 
 We got identical results than in the case of PPI shocks, with evidences of a common 
component between Argentina and Uruguay  (Table A.4.5.). In the case of other shocks - 
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domestic interest rates, money aggregate, real exchange rates – we did not find any hints of 
common trend (Tables A.4.6, A.4.7, A.4.8). As the three last shocks account more or less for 
the economic policy, it is once more a proof of the lack of coordination between the three 
main partners of Mercosur. In short, these outcomes confirm the conclusions of Eichengreen 
and Taylor (2004) outlining the lack of policy coordination within the Mercosur. The lack of 
common component for M2 confirms also the conclusion of our VAR: the money demand in 
the three countries follows idiosyncratic patterns!  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Our results converge to indicate that the Mercosur countries are not predisposed to form a 
monetary union either between them, or with the United States. First, cross-correlations 
show that the weak synchronization of cycles suggests the presence of asymmetric shocks 
and/or different economic policy responses to shocks. Second, the VARs confirm the weak 
coordination of the economic policies between these countries identified in other studies. 
While these countries seem all to be hit essentially by nominal shocks, the adjustments are 
different. Third, our state-space model shows the weak common component of shocks 
representing economic policies. It suggests again the weak coordination within the area. 
However, we must interpret with caution these results. On the one hand, the period of study 
is relatively short. On the other hand, the strong sensibility of these countries to international 
capital flows was not explicitly taken into account here. So, a future research has to concern a 
more precise modelling of the financial instability of these countries and its consequences as 
for the costs-benefits of a monetary union11. It is thus advisable to integrate into our analysis 
EMBI spreads and implications of the dollarization, notably from the point of view of the 
presence of balance-sheet effects following the currency depreciations. 
                                                 
11. Edwards (2006) uses probit panel regressions to investigate if countries forming a monetary union 
have a lower occurrence of sudden stop episodes and of current accounts reversal episodes, and if 
they are more able to absorb external shocks. His answers are negative: belonging to a currency union 
has not lower the probability of facing a sudden stop or a current account reversal, and external 
shocks have been amplified in currency union countries. 
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Appendix 1 IPI Cross-correlations 
 
Argentina – United States 
 
   US before            US after           lag       lead 
 
 
Brazil – United States 
 
   US before            US after           lag       lead 
 
 
Uruguay – United States 
 
   US before            US after           lag       lead 
 
 
 
Argentina - Brazil 
 
 Brazil before   Brazil after              lag       lead 
 
 
Argentina - Uruguay 
 
Uruguay before  Uruguay after      lag       lead 
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Brazil – Uruguay 
 
Uruguay before  Uruguay fter       lag       lead 
 
 29 
Appendix 2 Impulse responses 
 
A.2.1. Argentina: Responses to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ±2 S.E. 
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A.2.2. Brazil: Responses to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ±2 S.E. 
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A.2.3. Uruguay: Responses to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ±2 S.E. 
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Appendix 3 Variance Décomposition 
A.3.1. Argentine 
Variance decomposition of A_IPI: 
 Period WOP US_IPI US_R A_IPI A_PPI A_R A_M2 A_ER 
 1  3.763652  0.022910  4.205578  92.00786  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  5.554897  0.015342  2.876422  62.46640  5.865399  7.223865  15.98096  0.016714 
 3  5.516798  0.121131  3.449917  60.36241  5.874455  6.919005  17.73552  0.020771 
 4  5.552182  0.238287  3.627779  59.33562  5.796679  6.893949  18.49051  0.064991 
 8  5.518746  1.809263  4.122169  57.54720  5.805062  6.704235  18.42540  0.067919 
 12  5.450238  3.749775  4.254476  56.21216  5.676814  6.548620  18.03888  0.069038 
 16  5.396472  4.845095  4.284757  55.46592  5.601937  6.464237  17.87080  0.070788 
 
Variance decomposition of A_PPI: 
 Period WOP US_IPI US_R A_IPI A_PPI A_R A_M2 A_ER 
 1  15.33336  0.708019  0.318774  0.000406  83.63944  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  4.935638  2.165250  0.882880  0.192146  77.59767  0.672719  1.462201  12.09150 
 3  9.990234  1.864568  1.612145  0.386670  63.90967  3.592567  6.885186  11.75896 
 4  11.47963  4.428771  1.531248  0.741161  58.75427  3.564135  9.053674  10.44712 
 8  10.70969  9.281155  1.474719  0.798919  55.16284  3.306528  9.534252  9.731888 
 12  10.56974  10.28864  1.496685  0.790763  54.39880  3.269404  9.585223  9.600734 
 16  10.52615  10.61083  1.506556  0.787601  54.16175  3.257146  9.589769  9.560196 
 
Variance decomposition of A_R: 
 Period WOP US_IPI US_R A_IPI A_PPI A_R A_M2 A_ER 
 1  6.009516  0.089900  14.92659  2.266136  16.88096  59.82690  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  3.845705  1.781500  9.466145  1.476737  37.39329  38.07112  3.019730  4.945771 
 3  4.370098  2.662544  8.103218  1.436003  34.45647  34.26888  8.281322  6.421468 
 4  5.019000  4.675698  7.368192  1.743679  31.90748  31.78210  11.60032  5.903529 
 8  4.873454  6.805627  7.058761  1.979452  30.67691  29.80135  13.26582  5.538627 
 12  4.879087  6.819323  7.087785  1.997073  30.61823  29.73761  13.33411  5.526780 
 16  4.878098  6.912970  7.096314  1.996207  30.57965  29.69914  13.31793  5.519691 
 
Variance decomposition of A_M2: 
 Period WOP US_IPI US_R A_IPI A_PPI A_R A_M2 A_ER 
 1  1.007475  2.326443  2.457062  0.866016  11.64951  9.667745  72.02575  0.000000 
 2  2.670277  2.452353  3.147996  3.139987  9.974393  7.957276  69.59718  1.060542 
 3  2.428355  2.227064  3.081941  3.752023  9.318943  8.322913  69.58280  1.285965 
 4  2.323869  2.132974  3.284424  4.148117  9.862104  8.116609  68.90267  1.229228 
 33
 8  2.562213  3.408950  3.954902  4.306790  9.936087  7.797902  66.85194  1.181221 
 12  2.565636  5.482629  4.123663  4.212258  9.693432  7.598405  65.17025  1.153730 
 16  2.548969  6.708688  4.163365  4.149113  9.546992  7.485791  64.25793  1.139152 
 
Variance decomposition of A_ER: 
 Period WOP US_IPI US_R A_IPI A_PPI A_R A_M2 A_ER 
 1  3.136809  3.607593  0.833326  0.005294  68.65896  0.005040  0.363799  23.38918 
 2  14.38427  2.803045  0.925904  0.367028  55.91000  4.507546  4.562126  16.54008 
 3  13.27796  4.526414  1.003163  0.581251  56.01463  4.218201  4.412937  15.96544 
 4  13.78940  4.716806  1.073178  0.573945  55.35410  4.296269  4.368721  15.82759 
 8  13.95833  4.727060  1.083520  0.577745  55.23754  4.284660  4.362236  15.76891 
 12  13.95359  4.768359  1.091198  0.578096  55.20648  4.282198  4.360183  15.75990 
 16  13.94875  4.800465  1.093773  0.577918  55.18473  4.280561  4.360054  15.75375 
A.3.2. Brazil 
Variance decomposition of B_IPI: 
 Period WOP US_IPI US_R B_IPI B_PPI B_R B_M2 B_ER 
 1  5.466197  4.723471  7.147304  82.66303  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  9.546873  4.605419  6.684467  77.19194  0.083710  0.065183  1.534582  0.287828 
 3  9.506756  4.509395  6.595288  76.30939  0.879516  0.296698  1.588258  0.314698 
 4  9.475566  4.503319  6.587295  76.05661  1.062832  0.346455  1.589626  0.378297 
 8  9.523259  4.601220  6.692321  75.71937  1.078862  0.385605  1.601933  0.397429 
 12  9.425302  4.933341  6.757360  74.90071  1.112151  0.675672  1.709730  0.485732 
 16  9.309708  5.145637  6.749711  74.05770  1.161052  1.130952  1.870571  0.574672 
 
Variance decomposition of B_PPI: 
 Period WOP US_IPI US_R B_IPI B_PPI B_R B_M2 B_ER 
 1  3.636068  0.033197  0.191564  14.88792  81.25125  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  1.836185  0.434500  0.346501  8.899886  74.17907  4.432703  0.000125  9.871029 
 3  1.776747  1.710860  0.363398  7.758128  70.47734  6.063936  1.632182  10.21741 
 4  2.350212  2.273033  0.385259  7.612866  67.80253  7.482184  2.370816  9.723095 
 8  3.585077  2.937933  1.299527  7.581789  64.15041  8.523439  2.633149  9.288670 
 12  3.514478  5.678050  2.343629  7.407094  59.26592  9.476000  3.145876  9.168953 
 16  3.192917  7.391542  2.778134  7.435437  54.08961  11.91279  4.171748  9.027819 
 
Variance decomposition of B_R: 
 Period WOP US_IPI US_R B_IPI B_PPI B_R B_M2 B_ER 
 1  0.494327  0.047197  2.335269  11.29210  38.81776  47.01334  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  1.251293  0.514391  2.916948  8.281342  35.80124  43.50934  7.392426  0.333016 
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 3  1.997194  1.117670  2.754367  7.696670  32.71246  44.09799  9.288880  0.334775 
 4  2.552981  1.386610  2.564871  7.649358  30.67137  44.47598  10.16078  0.538041 
 8  3.530253  1.477429  2.471630  7.669364  28.56820  44.84659  10.68602  0.750520 
 12  3.690927  2.473801  2.842816  7.566941  27.94706  44.04887  10.54851  0.881073 
 16  3.548842  3.532257  3.087117  7.551422  26.97772  43.50172  10.62975  1.171171 
 
Variance decomposition of B_M2: 
 Period WOP US_IPI US_R B_IPI B_PPI B_R B_M2 B_ER 
 1  3.043986  1.691426  0.058942  9.666008  45.06444  13.49413  26.98107  0.000000 
 2  2.699535  2.730625  0.099477  8.666797  48.85944  11.21481  22.50233  3.226980 
 3  2.567351  3.947496  0.092225  8.447074  48.40855  11.94661  21.15870  3.432005 
 4  2.751187  4.484246  0.118438  8.403688  47.31516  12.61617  20.97908  3.332020 
 8  3.473925  4.759115  0.635957  8.404523  45.64089  13.29950  20.48964  3.296450 
 12  3.479011  6.331031  1.323997  8.247128  43.65859  13.53861  19.92077  3.500863 
 16  3.270273  7.459752  1.693210  8.207452  41.24523  14.82717  19.53315  3.763769 
 
Variance decomposition of B_ER: 
 Period WOP US_IPI US_R B_IPI B_PPI B_R B_M2 B_ER 
 1  2.340308  0.197605  0.000774  5.150536  23.17447  6.847276  2.102308  60.18672 
 2  1.975868  1.473256  0.016778  8.042244  27.17983  6.858723  3.576871  50.87643 
 3  1.890503  1.514568  0.075785  7.555662  29.19473  6.647986  3.430441  49.69033 
 4  1.915869  1.496430  0.077723  7.506280  29.36789  6.669237  3.520375  49.44620 
 8  2.091180  1.647640  0.234967  7.461303  29.19991  6.685635  3.542893  49.13647 
 12  2.076076  2.093994  0.402767  7.443688  28.83456  6.960383  3.650195  48.53834 
 16  2.049014  2.384021  0.486531  7.451041  28.47841  7.412245  3.813751  47.92499 
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A.3.3 Uruguay 
Variance decomposition of U_IPI: 
 Period WOP US_IPI US_R U_IPI U_PPI U_R U_M2 U_ER 
 1  0.324544  4.178657  1.131742  94.36506  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.395337  4.231890  1.552191  85.52875  3.340129  0.003264  2.291797  2.656640 
 3  0.392668  4.221588  2.370322  83.47108  3.675583  0.124793  2.865205  2.878761 
 4  0.429223  4.407274  2.388397  83.21871  3.662922  0.135840  2.875204  2.882428 
 8  0.436008  5.124344  2.686739  82.23894  3.652750  0.156354  2.851047  2.853817 
 12  0.434052  5.535849  2.804888  81.74302  3.642711  0.162195  2.836930  2.840354 
 16  0.433010  5.711111  2.850874  81.53722  3.637315  0.164802  2.830969  2.834701 
 
Variance decomposition of U_PPI: 
 Period WOP US_IPI US_R U_IPI U_PPI U_R U_M2 U_ER 
 1  0.973501  2.476455  0.012964  0.564886  95.97219  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  1.113939  3.236243  0.339338  0.988322  90.96560  0.594259  0.065827  2.696477 
 3  1.013674  5.460685  0.341341  1.116973  87.31261  1.987269  0.078471  2.688980 
 4  1.037086  7.678841  0.353923  1.098279  84.41019  2.707848  0.074828  2.639000 
 8  1.223373  11.65244  0.516392  1.199090  79.58489  3.261021  0.071263  2.491523 
 12  1.236584  12.47603  0.610800  1.220787  78.64352  3.277863  0.072035  2.462374 
 16  1.234889  12.67662  0.649141  1.223847  78.41081  3.276125  0.072650  2.455919 
 
Variance decomposition of U_R: 
 Period WOP US_IPI US_R U_IPI U_PPI U_R U_M2 U_ER 
 1  1.065680  7.346287  1.393505  0.672532  44.65494  44.86705  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.612598  13.24507  0.781596  0.595779  49.21094  31.96556  0.039597  3.548860 
 3  0.641946  19.30050  1.061680  0.767444  44.68882  30.18419  0.032711  3.322715 
 4  0.770800  24.53563  1.474841  0.762694  40.84711  28.56069  0.041936  3.006295 
 8  0.946566  33.34530  2.580023  0.977870  34.52117  25.05735  0.052781  2.518938 
 12  0.932701  35.38822  3.064134  1.028088  33.01444  24.08995  0.062636  2.419837 
 16  0.921664  35.97586  3.254997  1.037261  32.56536  23.78531  0.067000  2.392553 
 
Variance decomposition of U_M2: 
 Period WOP US_IPI US_R U_IPI U_PPI U_R U_M2 U_ER 
 1  2.679765  5.573089  9.628792  0.004157  15.35849  3.423424  63.33228  0.000000 
 2  2.287820  5.505612  8.012389  2.222041  27.79488  2.678660  50.64254  0.856060 
 3  2.165220  7.834070  7.734754  2.126731  28.10881  3.358750  47.79625  0.875412 
 4  2.091367  9.978026  7.652497  2.089492  27.66074  3.667399  45.97951  0.880974 
 8  2.007042  14.80091  7.814100  2.068256  25.86588  3.904170  42.71656  0.823075 
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 12  1.972803  16.18907  7.963004  2.065244  25.31256  3.878151  41.80750  0.811659 
 16  1.959353  16.62586  8.031027  2.061965  25.13590  3.863373  41.51336  0.809162 
 
Variance decomposition of U_ER: 
 Period WOP US_IPI US_R U_IPI U_PPI U_R U_M2 U_ER 
 1  9.379882  0.002651  17.11941  8.049184  5.094891  0.272064  11.88215  48.19977 
 2  7.261007  0.189239  15.78597  6.626321  20.53733  2.039484  9.780016  37.78064 
 3  7.025384  0.760631  15.33122  7.216480  21.80876  1.963731  9.409137  36.48466 
 4  6.992753  0.852965  15.32610  7.209052  21.96055  1.976918  9.372830  36.30883 
 8  6.944672  1.125039  15.44981  7.144479  22.03689  1.974686  9.303142  36.02128 
 12  6.928539  1.298457  15.48421  7.125275  21.99336  1.969555  9.278724  35.92189 
 16  6.919814  1.389111  15.49429  7.117061  21.96834  1.967986  9.267376  35.87602 
 
Appendix 4 Unobservable Components Models Estimations 
Foreign Variables Shocks: Impact on the three economies 
 
A4.1. Oil Prices 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) 0.819431 0.016923 48.42136 0.0000
C(2) 0.686534 0.019256 35.65248 0.0000
C(3) 0.823999 0.027538 29.92181 0.0000
 
A.4.2. US IPI 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) 0.724298 0.032420 22.34090 0.0000
C(2) 0.623213 0.029792 20.91877 0.0000
C(3) 0.680470 0.030621 22.22210 0.0000
 
A.4.3. US Federal Fund Rates 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) 0.713784 0.047974 14.87868 0.0000
C(2) 0.515605 0.016995 30.33916 0.0000
C(3) 0.621358 0.031831 19.52076 0.0000
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Domestic Variables Shocks: 
 
In all our results, C(1), C(2), and C(3) point out the weight of common component in the structural shocks for 
Argentina, Brazil, and Urugay respectively. The reference country is defined as the country whose the cycle has 
a dominant weight during the attribution of the values of initialization. When Argentina is present, it is chosen as 
country of reference to the cycle of which are compared the other cycles. Otherwise, the reference country is 
Brazil. This choice is arbitrary, but it does not modify the results. In particular, it does not hide the presence of a 
common component when there is such component. 
 
A.4.4. Domestic IPI 
 
Three Countries 
Sspace: CHOCS4    
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) 0.988419 0.075659 13.06418 0.0000
C(2) 0.062053 0.066537 0.932605 0.3510
C(3) 0.089826 0.052552 1.709269 0.0874
 
Argentina - Brazil 
Sspace: CHOCS4_AB   
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) 0.996318 0.075475 13.20067 0.0000
C(2) 0.061896 0.066450 0.931472 0.3516
 
Argentina - Uruguay 
Sspace: CHOCS4_AU   
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) 0.992016 0.072712 13.64311 0.0000
C(3) 0.089716 0.052350 1.713791 0.0866
 
Brazil - Uruguay 
Sspace: CHOCS4_BU   
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C(2) 0.999858 0.082655 12.09675 0.0000
C(3) -0.011601 0.066542 -0.174339 0.8616
 
 
 
 
 38
A.4.5. Domestic PPI 
 
Three Countries 
Sspace: CHOCS5    
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) 0.986720 0.038162 25.85603 0.0000
C(2) 0.060653 0.056806 1.067715 0.2856
C(3) 0.099918 0.039829 2.508659 0.0121
 
Argentina - Brazil  
Sspace: CHOCS5_AB   
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) 0.996488 0.039015 25.54144 0.0000
C(2) 0.060459 0.056643 1.067373 0.2858
 
Argentina - Uruguay 
Sspace: CHOCS5_AU   
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) 0.990184 0.035279 28.06742 0.0000
C(3) 0.099788 0.039647 2.516874 0.0118
 
Brazil - Uruguay 
Sspace: CHOCS5_BU   
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C(2) 0.998744 0.087787 11.37696 0.0000
C(3) -0.034753 0.049299 -0.704946 0.4808
 
A.4.6. Domestic Interest Rates 
 
Three Countries 
Sspace: CHOCS6    
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) 0.998135 0.058554 17.04639 0.0000
C(2) 0.031792 0.070349 0.451915 0.6513
C(3) 0.029897 0.061313 0.487616 0.6258
 
 39
Argentina – Brazil 
Sspace: CHOCS6_AB   
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) 0.999029 0.057348 17.42039 0.0000
C(2) 0.031783 0.069328 0.458445 0.6466
 
Argentina-Uruguay 
Sspace: CHOCS6_AU   
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) 0.999101 0.057251 17.45115 0.0000
C(3) 0.029889 0.060465 0.494313 0.6211
 
Brazil - Uruguay 
Sspace: CHOCS6_BU   
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C(2) 0.995383 0.060596 16.42666 0.0000
C(3) 0.067176 0.048546 1.383755 0.1664
 
A.4.7. Domestic Monetary Aggregates 
 
Three Countries 
Sspace: CHOCS7    
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) 0.996839 0.081676 12.20484 0.0000
C(2) 0.013360 0.112377 0.118888 0.9054
C(3) 0.054749 0.090159 0.607243 0.5437
 
Argentina - Brazil 
Sspace: CHOCS7_AB   
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) 0.999819 0.082357 12.14010 0.0000
C(2) 0.013348 0.112580 0.118566 0.9056
 
Argentina - Uruguay 
Sspace: CHOCS7_AU   
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) 0.997006 0.048762 20.44652 0.0000
C(3) 0.054746 0.090161 0.607206 0.5437
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 Brazil - Uruguay 
Sspace: CHOCS7_BU   
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C(2) 0.998854 0.112688 8.863914 0.0000
C(3) -0.033048 0.076812 -0.430248 0.6670
 
A.4.8. Real Exchange Rates 
 
Three Countries 
Sspace: CHOCS8    
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) 0.998111 0.098674 10.11523 0.0000
C(2) 0.018343 0.057335 0.319934 0.7490
C(3) 0.039594 0.070296 0.563239 0.5733
 
Argentina - Brazil 
Sspace: CHOCS8_AB   
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) 0.999676 0.098761 10.12216 0.0000
C(2) 0.018334 0.057094 0.321123 0.7481
 
Argentina - Uruguay 
Sspace: CHOCS8_AU   
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) 0.998435 0.097671 10.22239 0.0000
C(3) 0.039590 0.069968 0.565824 0.5715
 
Brazil - Uruguay 
Sspace: CHOCS8_BU   
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C(2) 0.997283 0.063833 15.62330 0.0000
C(3) 0.052956 0.055387 0.956107 0.3390
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